

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED SOCIALIST PRESIDENTS AND FREE-MARKET REFORMS: A POLITICAL ECONOMY EXAMINATION

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Left-of-center parties are rhetorically against liberalizing markets, but historical evidence proves otherwise in certain situations. The United States is vitally interested in the democratic and economic success of developing countries, as stated in United States national security strategy. This thesis uses economic institutionalism to examine the occasions on which left-of-center presidents successfully implemented neoliberal economic reforms. Case studies of Chile under President Patricio Aylwin and Brazil under Fernando Henrique Cardoso are used as evidence.

KEYWORDS: Politics, Presidents, Economy, Economic Reform, Institutions, Neoliberalism, Country Studies

NATO AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM: OBJECTIVES AND OBSTACLES

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This thesis examines the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Global War on Terrorism. It focuses on NATO's objectives as well as the obstacles to its active and effective participation in countering this new security challenge. The thesis first analyzes NATO's response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, and the resulting transformation in NATO's strategic focus and capabilities, which is designed to ensure its relevance in the new security environment. The thesis then examines the key political and military factors that might, in some circumstances, undermine the Atlantic Alliance and hinder the important task of combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These factors constitute challenges that must be successfully met for the Atlantic Alliance to play a strong role in the war on terrorism.

KEYWORDS: NATO, Terrorism, Global, Transformation, Capabilities, Afghanistan, Iraq, Preemption, Deployability

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SAUDI SECURITY: CHALLENGES FOR THE POST-SADDAM ERA

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Events at the beginning of the 21st century have brought a fundamental change to the security environment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of a significance not witnessed in the region since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003 eliminated the most significant external threat facing Saudi Arabia. At the same time, internal threats to the Kingdom appear to be increasing. The demographic and economic challenges facing the Kingdom are contributing to internal instability. Increased instances of political violence, particularly suicide bombings against targets within the Kingdom, have been carried out by terrorists linked to al-Qaeda. These attacks have targeted Westerners and, for the first time in May 2003, non-Saudi Muslims.

This paper examines the security challenges facing Saudi Arabia at the start of the 21st century. Arguments are made that while external threats to the Kingdom remain, the greater threat to security may lie within the Saudi state: the result of a failure to address current political realities. Major security challenges include the threat from Iran, economic and demographic pressures, the question of succession within the ruling al-Saud family, and maintaining the U.S.-Saudi security partnership, a relationship which has endured over 50 years.

KEYWORDS: Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf Security

ORGANIZED CRIME AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE ALBANIAN CASE

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This thesis argues that organized crime constitutes a threat to democracy in Albania, and consequently to the national security of the country. Organized crime is considered a phenomenon that is corroding democratic institutions. Corruption of government and law enforcement agencies and the merging of organized crime with the state machinery presents a major threat to democracy and the national security of the country. This thesis analyzes the emergence of organized crime in Albania, its root causes, structure and activities, and threats posed by organized crime to the national security of Albania. Recommendations are provided on how to tackle the issue of organized crime in Albania.

KEYWORDS: Organized Crime, Corruption, Drugs, Arms and Human Trafficking, Law Enforcement, Democracy

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. NAVY IN THE PERSIAN GULF

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This thesis analyzes a range of possible future scenarios of security conditions in the Persian Gulf, in order to determine future requirements for forward-deployed Naval forces in the region. Examination of the past 30 years of U.S. Naval activity in the Persian Gulf provides examples of a full spectrum of deployment options, ranging from a nominal presence in the 1970's to the recent deployment of forces unmatched in

Naval history. Two contrasting scenarios, “best case” and “worst case,” are proposed by way of establishing a framework to evaluate the Naval presence requirements that may arise in the future. Factors that could effect Naval presence in the Gulf are success or failure of nation-building in Iraq, the path Iran takes regarding weapons of mass destruction, the progress of the Global War on Terrorism, and the perception of American forces by the Arab world. These scenarios reveal the need for a sustained Naval presence in order to meet the future trends in the Persian Gulf. The Navy’s recently implemented Fleet Response Plan calls for “deployment for a purpose.” The purpose of Naval forces in the Persian Gulf is clear: to provide persistent maritime dominance, power projection, and effective crisis response.

KEYWORDS: Naval Operations, Persian Gulf, Naval Strategy, Fleet Response Plan, Surge

WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM INDIA TO COUNTER TERRORISM?

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Terrorism is the principal threat to global and national security in the post-11 September world. Facing terrorist threats at home and abroad, the United States has declared counterterrorism its top priority. As the United States embarks on its global counterterrorism campaign, it must draw on the experience of other countries. Specifically India, with an extensive history of counterterrorism efforts, can reveal important lessons applicable to America’s endeavors. India offers three primary examples of counterterrorism strategies: Punjab, its northeast region, and Kashmir, from which four findings emerge. First, aggressive military operations are central to beating terrorism. Second, economic and social development programs, though not enough to end terrorism alone, are essential components of the larger national strategy. Third, terrorism cannot be stopped without international assistance. Terror networks export personnel, knowledge, weapons, and money across international boundaries with growing frequency. This cannot be effectively stopped without a coordinated national and international effort. Fourth, to be successful, a counterterrorism strategy must engender the public’s support for the government and promulgate a sense of public ownership to the conflict. By applying these lessons from the Indian case study, America’s efforts to end terrorism both domestically and internationally may be significantly more productive.

KEYWORDS: 11 September 2001, Afghanistan, Anti-terrorism, Assam, Azadi, Bhindranwale, Bluestar, Counterterrorism, India, Iraq, ISI, Jaish-e-Mohammad, JKLF, Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Nagaland, NSCN, Pakistan, Punjab, Sikh, South Asia, Strategy, Terrorist Organizations, Tripura, Usama bin-Laden

JAPAN’S STRATEGIC FUTURE: COALITION OPERATIONS

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The evolution of the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) over the past fifty years has created debate in Japan’s Parliament over its legality, purpose, direction, and normalization. The JSDF appears to be taking steps to “normalize.” If so, what are the indicators and have any of the steps been achieved? This thesis seeks to analyze the trends of the JSDF in its evolution from a National Police Reserve to a self-defense force as to the roles and missions that it has chosen to accept or reject. Also, the issues that arise out of Article 9 in Japan’s Constitution will be examined to determine if there is a conflict in interpretation. Japan’s major political parties’ views on Article 9 and the JSDF will be presented in order to determine where they stand on the issues. Japan’s regional neighbors and their possible reactions to a normalization of the JSDF will be presented, in addition to other factors that will either aid or impede the normalization of

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the JSDF. Finally, recommendations regarding the United States' approach to engaging a normalized Japan will be presented.

KEYWORDS: Japan, Constitution, JSDF, Transformation, Normalization

PAKISTAN'S KASHMIR POLICY AND STRATEGY SINCE 1947

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This thesis analyzes Pakistan's Kashmir policy and strategy since 1947. Pakistan has sought to obtain the accession of Kashmir for over fifty years. This policy has its origins in Pakistan's struggle for a separate state for South Asia's Muslims, its belief that India never accepted Pakistan's existence, and Pakistan's domestic cleavages and institutional weaknesses. Because these beliefs and characteristics remain today, Pakistan is unlikely to drop its claim to Kashmir. Pakistan's strategy to achieve its objectives has included diplomacy, war, and proxy war. This thesis explores how internal and external variables have impacted Pakistan's methods and what this means for the current effort to end the proxy war in Kashmir. Although Pakistan is unlikely to abandon its claims to Kashmir, an analysis of Pakistan's shift from diplomacy to war in 1965 and from diplomacy to proxy war in 1990 demonstrates that Pakistan's strategy responds to external constraints and opportunities. The United States may not be able to end the dispute over Kashmir by pressuring Pakistan to drop its claims, but Washington retains sufficient influence to persuade Pakistan to use a peaceful strategy to pursue its claims to Kashmir.

KEYWORDS: Kashmir, Pakistan, Strategy, Policy, U.S.-Pakistan Relations, Proxy War, South Asia, Islamist

SHIELDING ACHILLES' HEEL: CHALLENGES FACING NORTHCOM IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN

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This thesis examines the role U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is performing in the maritime domain as the new Unified Command responsible for homeland defense. NORTHCOM does not currently have a permanent maritime component assigned for missions. Instead, it relies on contingency planning for future events and theoretically acts as a coordinating bridge between the Navy and Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Defense/Security (HLD/HLS) issues.

The primary objective of this research is to answer the question: Can NORTHCOM effectively execute maritime homeland defense and support homeland security without having permanently assigned maritime forces?

Secondly, this thesis seeks to scrutinize the seam in transition from Maritime Homeland Security to Maritime Homeland Defense and explicate potential mission priority, service capability, and geographic and cultural mismatches which could potentially stymie command and control in the transition from an HLS to HLD posture in the event of a seaborne terrorist attack.

KEYWORDS: Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, Maritime Homeland Security, Maritime Homeland Defense, Coast Guard, Navy, Joint, Northern Command, NORTHCOM, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense, Port Security, Harbor Defense, Joint Harbor Operations Center, JHOC, Wargame, Service Culture, Mission Priorities